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Insider Trading and Soft Information: U.S. v. Nacchio
I. INTRODUCTION
Joseph Nacchio, former CEO of Qwest, is currently serving a sixyear sentence for insider trading. Nacchio was convicted of insider
trading after he exercised his Qwest stock options at the same time
he received information that Qwest’s 2001 earnings were in danger
of falling nearly one billion dollars short of projected revenue
estimates. Nacchio’s case is unique because it demonstrates the
importance of following proper procedure when introducing expert
testimony in a criminal trial under the Daubert standard, as well as
the difficulty of determining “materiality” in an insider trading case
based on “soft” information.
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Nacchio II is problematic for two
reasons: first, the court conflated the requirements of Rule 16
disclosures and the Daubert standard for qualifying experts by
creating an onerous burden on defendants attempting to admit
expert testimony at the early stages of trial. Additionally, Nacchio II’s
stringent “soft” information requirement may discourage companies
from disclosing accurate or ambitious revenue projections to the
public given the potential liability for insider trading if internal
documents question the accuracy of those projections. Investors may
thus be left with less information to inform their investment
decisions.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Qwest’s 2001 Earnings Estimates
In September 2000, Qwest made public its 2001 earnings
projections. Qwest CEO Nacchio1 announced the company’s
projected total revenue would be in the range of $21.3 to $21.7
billion.2 Qwest also prepared internal targets higher than the
projections announced publicly.3
1. Time magazine named Nacchio one of the top fifty “Cyber Elites” in 1998. TIME
DIGITAL ARCHIVE, Jan. 7, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/digital/cyberelite/32.html. At
one point his net worth was estimated at $170 million. Id. Nacchio has also been described as
“[b]rash and outspoken.” Id.
2. United States v. Nacchio (Nacchio I), 519 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 2008); see
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Qwest officials soon became concerned that the public
projections were too high. Qwest executives, including Nacchio,
received a “risk estimate” forecasting a potential shortfall in 2001
earnings. The memo indicated earnings could end up nearly $900
million below the public projections. This shortfall was based on
Qwest’s failure to account for changes in revenue streams.
Specifically, Qwest had traditionally counted on revenues from longterm leases of space on Qwest’s network known as “indefeasible
rights of use” (“IRUs”). Qwest collected the lease payment at the
beginning of the lease, and thus, IRU sales produced one-time
revenue rather than a perpetual stream of income. As the public
projections failed to account for these revenue streams drying up, the
risk estimate indicated Qwest would have to make an “aggressive
pivot” or “shift” from IRUs to other consistent streams of revenue
to meet projections.4 Nacchio further understood that a slow start to
2001 could have a “snowball effect” on the rest of the year’s
earnings.5 Nacchio acknowledged this reality when he told his sales
staff that “something big” had to happen by April or earnings would
fall short of estimates.6
Qwest met its projected earnings in the first two quarters of
2001. However, in early April, Qwest’s executive vice president
informed Nacchio that the IRU market was drying up. In late April
2001, Nacchio discussed Qwest’s earnings estimates with investors.
Nacchio told investors the company was “still confirming” company
projections. When asked to break down the company’s revenue
streams into recurring streams and one-time transactions, Nacchio
refused.7 When further pressed about how Qwest planned to meet its

also United States v. Nacchio (Nacchio II), 555 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2009) (directing the
reader to Nacchio I for the full factual background).
3. The internal targets were set higher than the public projections to encourage
employees to exceed public projections. Performance bonuses were also based on the internal
targets. Nacchio I, 519 F.3d at 1145.
4. Id. To achieve its revenue projections, Qwest would have had to double its growth
rate for recurring revenue. Nacchio knew in December 2000 that the shift from IRUs to
recurring revenue had to take place early in 2001, or the company would have to revise its
public projections downward. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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revenue projections, Nacchio merely responded that “Qwest had
better products and better management.”8
B. Nacchio’s Stock Sales
Nacchio, as is common for corporate executives, received a
substantial portion of his salary in stock options.9 In October 2000,
Nacchio announced that he planned to exercise his options and sell
one million shares of Qwest stock per quarter. However, Nacchio
did not enter into a fixed sales plan until February 2001. After Qwest
stock dropped below $38 a share less than a month later, Nacchio
cancelled his fixed sales plan and determined he would sell, as he
traditionally had done, during quarterly trading windows.10
During the second quarter trading window in 2001, Nacchio
sold over 1.2 million shares of Qwest stock. At this time, Qwest
stock traded between $37 and $42 a share. Accordingly, Nacchio
made over $50 million from the sale of his options. While the
number of options Nacchio sold was slightly more than the one
million shares per quarter he announced in October 2000, it was
four times the average number of shares he sold from 1998 to 2000.
After this trading window had closed, Nacchio entered into another
fixed sales plan approved by Qwest’s general counsel. At the end of
May 2001, Qwest’s stock price again dropped below $38 a share.
Nacchio sold no more shares after this point. Nacchio eventually
“finished the year with more vested options than he had owned at
the beginning” of the year.11
In mid-August 2001, Qwest disclosed its lagging IRU sales in an
SEC filing. Initially, the impact on Qwest stock was negligible. Later,
on September 10, 2001, Nacchio lowered the company’s public
earning projections by one billion dollars. One company executive
testified at trial that Nacchio announced the revised company
earnings projections separately from the SEC filing because he
wanted it to seem that he had not been concealing information. By
the end of September, Qwest’s stock was trading at 40% of its
January price. 12

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 1146.
Id.
Id. at 1147.
Id.
Id. at 1148.
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C. Nacchio’s Prosecution and Trial
After a lengthy investigation, Nacchio was indicted and charged
with forty-two counts of insider trading. The government accused
Nacchio of trading on the basis of
material nonpublic information about Qwest—specifically that the
company was relying heavily on IRU sales, a non-recurring source
of revenue to meet its first and second quarter public guidance, and
that the company had not made the needed shift to recurring
revenue which placed the company at substantial risk of not
meeting its year-end guidance.13

Three days before trial, Nacchio announced he would be calling
an expert witness. The government requested a summary of the
expert’s testimony pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
16(b)(1)(c) (“Rule 16”), which Nacchio provided.14 The
government, however, argued that the summary did not comply with
the requirements of Rule 16. The district court agreed with the
government and concluded that Nacchio’s expert testimony “offered
no bases or reasons whatsoever for [the expert’s] opinions contained
in the summary.”15
Nacchio later submitted a revised summary of his expert’s
testimony. In the revised disclosure, Nacchio listed the expert’s
numerous qualifications as an academic, researcher, and teacher in
law and finance. The summary also explained that the expert had
“analyzed Qwest’s [revenue projections], its actual stock
performance, and reaction from the investment community; Qwest’s
[revenue projections] compared to the [revenue projections] history
of other telecommunications firms; and various facets of Qwest’s
revenue from indefeasible rights of use.”16 In a sixty-three page
motion to dismiss, the government challenged the expert’s testimony
and moved to exclude it. The government again argued that Nacchio
had not complied with Rule 16 and further contended that the
expert’s methodology was unreliable under Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals and Federal Rule of Evidence 702.17 The district

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
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Id. at 1149.
Nacchio II, 555 F.3d 1234, 1237 (10th Cir. 2009).
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court again sided with the government and excluded the expert’s
testimony.18
The district court questioned the expert’s methodology and
found that it did not comply with Daubert or Rule 702. The district
court was particularly concerned with the expert’s methodology.19
The district judge found that the expert’s methodology was
“absolutely undisclosed” and that Nacchio had made no attempt to
“establish that [the expert’s] testimony [was] the product of reliable
principles and methods or that [the expert] applied some principles
and methods reliably.”20 Thus, the court did not allow Nacchio’s
expert to testify before the jury as an expert, despite last-ditch efforts
by Nacchio’s defense team.21
After trial and six days of jury deliberation, the jury convicted
Nacchio on nineteen counts of insider trading. Nacchio was
sentenced to six years imprisonment on each count to be served
concurrently, two year’s supervised release, a $19 million fine, and
forfeiture of $52 million.22
D. Tenth Circuit Three-Judge Panel
Nacchio promptly appealed the jury verdict to the Tenth Circuit.
Nacchio challenged the district court’s decision to exclude his expert
witness and questioned the sufficiency of the evidence before the
jury.23 The Tenth Circuit agreed with Nacchio that the district
court’s decision to exclude his expert testimony was reversible
error.24 The court did not, however, agree that the evidence was
insufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict.25
obligation to test a proposed expert’s methodology in advance of his testimony.”); see also
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); FED. R. EVID. 702.
18. Nacchio II, 555 F.3d at 1239, 1263 (concluding that the deficiencies in Nacchio’s
disclosures were so glaring that “they hardly warrant[ed] the 63 pages of ink the Government
has spilled in opposing the testimony”).
19. Id. at 1239.
20. Id. (noting that there was only “one ‘woefully inadequate’ sentence” discussing the
process undertaken by the expert to inform himself of the facts of the case).
21. Id. After the district judge excluded the expert testimony, Nacchio’s lawyer asked
the judge if he could speak on the issue. Id. The judge refused to hear the attorney and said, “I
have your motion, I have the government’s motion, I have your response. Any argument that
you wish to make could have been put in the response.” Id.
22. Id.
23. Nacchio I, 519 F.3d 1140, 1148, 1166 (10th Cir. 2008).
24. Id. at 1148–49.
25. Id. at 1149.
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1. Expert testimony
In a split decision, the three-judge panel held that Nacchio’s
expert testimony had been improperly excluded. The court first
looked at Nacchio’s disclosures against the Rule 16 standard. Rule
16, the panel explained, requires a defendant to disclose an expert’s
“opinions, the bases and reasons for those opinions, and the
[expert’s] qualifications.”26 The court noted that Rule 16 does not
require extensive discussion of an expert’s methodology, rather the
purpose of Rule 16 is to put the government on notice of the
expert’s testimony to aid in trial preparation.27
Here, the panel concluded that Nacchio’s Rule 16 disclosure
“did exactly what the law required.”28 Rule 16 only requires that a
defendant disclose a “written summary of any [expert] testimony”
and “describe the witness’s opinions, the bases and reasons for those
opinions, and the witness’s qualifications.”29 The disclosure, the
court explained, stated that the expert’s opinion was “based on” his
analysis of Nacchio’s trades, stock price data, and executive options.30
Likewise, the disclosure stated the expert’s reasoning; specifically,
that “principles of risk reduction and the pattern of [Nacchio’s] sales
were inconsistent with” insider trading.31 Thus, the panel concluded
that Nacchio had fully complied with the requirements of Rule 16.
Finally, the panel concluded that the district court had used the
Rule 16 disclosure process as a substitute for a Daubert hearing. Rule
16, the court explained, is “not designed to allow the district court
to move immediately to a Daubert determination without briefs.”32
The panel acknowledged that the government had a right to demand
a Daubert hearing, but ultimately made clear that Rule 16
disclosures do not have to comply with Daubert.33

26. Id. at 1150.
27. Id. at 1151.
28. Id. The court reasoned that perhaps the district court had confused the civil and
criminal standard for expert testimony. In criminal trials, unlike civil cases, an expert “is not
required to present and disclose” his testimony before trial. Id. at 1152.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1151.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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2. Sufficiency of the evidence
Nacchio challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on three
grounds. First, Nacchio alleged that the information related to
Qwest’s revenue streams was not material. Second, he argued that he
did not act with willful intent, or scienter. Finally, he argued that
even if the information regarding Qwest’s revenue was material, it
was not a factor in his decision to trade. Ultimately, the Tenth
Circuit rejected each of these challenges.34
a. Materiality. On de novo review, the court looked at the jury
instructions “to determine whether they accurately informed the jury
of the governing law.”35 The key jury instruction charged the jury to
determine “whether the . . . matter omitted was of such importance
that it could reasonably be expected to cause a person to act or not
to act with respect to the securities transaction at issue.”36 Nacchio
contended this instruction was faulty because it failed to incorporate
the concepts of probability and magnitude. Nevertheless, the court
found that this instruction did not violate the Supreme Court’s test
for materiality, namely, that the “significance the reasonable investor
would place on the withheld . . . information” is the test for
materiality.37
The court also rejected Nacchio’s proposed jury instruction
modeled after the “bespeaks caution” rule in false-statement cases.38
The “bespeaks caution” rule essentially holds that if a speaker
qualifies a statement, someone hearing the statement should be wary
of it. Nacchio argued that because Qwest issued its public
projections in cautious tones, investors should have been wary of
Qwest’s performance, and thus, traded carefully. As a result, Nacchio
argued, had he disclosed the information regarding the slowing
revenue streams before trading, investors, who were already wary
because of the qualified public projection statements, would not
have changed the way they traded Qwest stock, and thus, the
information was not material.39 The court concluded even though

34. Id. at 1158.
35. Id. at 1158–59 (quoting United States v. McClatchey, 217 F.3d 823, 834 (10th
Cir. 2000)) (internal quotations omitted).
36. Id. at 1159.
37. Id. (quoting Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 (1988)).
38. Id. at 1161.
39. Id. at 1161–62.
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“the information already made available [to investors] was couched
in warnings[, it] does not make new information (such as the
information that IRUs constitute a dangerously high part of
revenues and that opportunities for new IRU sales were drying up)
immaterial.”40 After all, the court concluded, the issue is not whether
the information the company disclosed was materially misleading,
but whether the information on which Nacchio traded was
material.41
b. Scienter. Nacchio argued before the Tenth Circuit “that he
traded in good faith and did not ‘willfully’ violate [laws against
insider trading].”42 Specifically, Nacchio complained that portions of
the district judge’s instruction regarding “bad faith” were
improper.43 The Tenth Circuit reviewed the instructions relating to
bad faith and concluded that while the instructions “might have
been clearer,” the instructions did not prevent the jury from coming
to a proper determination regarding Nacchio’s willful conduct.44
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit held that the evidence presented
by the government at trial was sufficient for the jury to infer that
Nacchio “acted with the purpose to disobey the law or the
knowledge that he was doing so.”45 Reviewing the evidence
presented, the court noted Nacchio had several conversations with
other Qwest officials that could be reasonably interpreted as efforts
at concealing material information from investors. The most
damning testimony came from a Qwest official who suggested to
Nacchio that the revised earnings projections needed to be made
public as soon as possible. Nacchio, the official testified, questioned
whether the information needed to be made public. “Why do
[investors] need to know?” Nacchio asked.46 The official responded
that investors needed the IRU sales information to make an
informed decision about Qwest stock, to which Nacchio replied,
“[S]crew them, go tell them to buy.”47 Thus, the court concluded

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
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that the jury was justified in finding that Nacchio knew and willfully
concealed material inside information.48
c. Connection of inside information to the questionable trades. In
his final argument before the Tenth Circuit, Nacchio argued that
“the jury could not have [reasonably] concluded that his trades were
‘on the basis of’ inside information” as required by federal
regulation.49 The trial judge instructed the jury that to convict
Nacchio, the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Nacchio “actually used material non-public information in
deciding to trade,” not merely that he possessed the material nonpublic information.50
The Tenth Circuit indicated that this instruction may have been
too favorable to Nacchio. Rule 10b5-1 from the Code of Federal
Regulations states that an insider trades “on the basis of” material
non-public information “so long as he is ‘aware’” of the
information,51 unless the individual can rely on a safe-harbor
provided by the rule.52 Thus, under this standard, Nacchio could
have been found guilty merely because he was “aware” of the inside
information when he traded, even if he had unrelated reasons for
executing the stock sales.53 The court noted that because the jury
received an instruction more favorable to Nacchio than the law
requires and still convicted Nacchio, when reviewing the sufficiency
of the evidence, it would “look to what the law actually requires
rather than what the jury was instructed so long as the government
objected to the instruction below.”54 The government did object to
the instruction below and suggested an instruction stating the “jury
must find that the information was ‘a factor, however small,’” in
Nacchio’s decision to sell his options.55 Thus, the court explained, it
did not need to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to

48. Id. at 1167.
49. Id. (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(a)).
50. Id. (basing the jury instruction on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v.
Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1067 (9th Cir. 1998), which was decided before Rule 10(b)(5)-1 was
enacted).
51. Id. (quoting § 240.10b5-1(b)).
52. An automatic trading plan approved by the corporation is the most common safe
harbor that protects persons with non-public material information from claims of insider
trading. Id. (citing § 240.10b5-1(c)).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1168.
55. Id.
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demonstrate that Nacchio used the material non-public information
as the basis for his trades, merely that it was a “factor, however
small,” in his decision to sell his options.56
Reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court determined
that a reasonable jury could have inferred that Nacchio knew in April
and May of 2001 that the company’s earnings were sliding and that
he acted upon this material non-public information when he sold his
stock options. The court noted that Nacchio indeed had powerful
explanations for his actions. Ultimately, however, it concluded the
jury was justified in not believing Nacchio’s explanations because
testimony amply demonstrated that Nacchio knew “Qwest had not
made the necessary shift” from one-time to recurring revenue, and
thus, corporate earnings were destined to drop.57
3. Retrial
Because the three-judge panel concluded that the trial court had
improperly excluded the testimony of Nacchio’s expert, it reversed
his conviction.58 However, the panel noted that the government
could retry Nacchio a second time because the evidence presented
for each element of insider trading was sufficient.59
III. EN BANC REHEARING
In February 2009, the Tenth Circuit granted rehearing en banc
for the purpose of considering the expert testimony issue. In a 5-4
split, the court held that the expert testimony was properly excluded
at trial. Consequently, the court en banc upheld Nacchio’s
conviction.60
A. Expert Testimony
The en banc panel began its analysis of the expert testimony issue
by noting that it reviewed whether the district court properly

56. Id.
57. Id. at 1169.
58. Id. Judge Holmes disagreed with the panel’s determination that the expert
testimony was improperly excluded. See id. at 1170–75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 1169. The panel further concluded that it would be “unreasonably difficult to
expect [the current trial judge] to retry the case with a fresh mind,” and thus, the panel
ordered that a new trial judge be assigned. Id. at 1170.
60. Nacchio II, 555 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2009).
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performed its gatekeeping function under an abuse of discretion
standard.61 Under the abuse of discretion standard, the en banc panel
concluded that the district court properly performed its gatekeeping
role.62
The en banc panel rejected Nacchio’s argument (and the threejudge panel’s conclusion) that the district court excluded the expert
testimony on the supposed deficiencies of the Rule 16 disclosures.63
The court reasoned that “by the time the district court ruled to
exclude [the expert’s] testimony, it was clear that the court’s
principal concern was Daubert.”64 Despite the fact that the district
court’s decision to exclude was reached as the result of the
government’s challenge to the Rule 16 disclosures, the en banc panel
determined that statements made by the district court indicating that
the expert’s methods did not comply with Federal Rule of Evidence
702 (“Rule 702”), was undoubtedly “the primary rationale for the
court’s decision.”65 The en banc panel labeled the references to Rule
16 disclosures in the district court’s exclusion order as “ambiguous”
and “enigmatic,”66 and thus, the main thrust of the decision to
exclude was not based on Rule 16, but on Daubert and Rule 702.67
The court criticized Nacchio for his argument that he was not on
notice that Daubert issues had arisen as the trial began and the Rule
16 disclosures were debated. The court cited numerous instances
where mention or inference that Daubert issues were in play arose.
The court was particularly scathing of Nacchio’s attempt to
characterize the judge as having dismissed his expert testimony
saying, “Nacchio is attempting to recast an unremarkable district
court evidentiary ruling as an invidious act of judicial hubris. But it
will not work.”68
The court then held that Nacchio not only had notice that
Daubert and Rule 702 issues were at play, but also had more than
adequate opportunity to respond to these challenges. The court

61. Id. at 1241.
62. Id. at 1241–44.
63. Id. at 1242; see Nacchio I, 519 F.3d at 1153 (“The most straightforward reading of
the transcript is that the judge excluded the evidence on Rule 16 grounds alone.”).
64. Nacchio II, 555 F.3d at 1242.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1244.
68. Id. at 1247.
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reviewed the timeline of the Rule 16 disclosures and the
government’s challenge to the expert testimony and concluded that
Nacchio had a series of opportunities to address the Daubert
question.69 The en banc panel further concluded that if Nacchio felt
he needed more time to address Daubert issues, he bore the burden
of requesting more time.70 Consequently, after reviewing Nacchio’s
revised Rule 16 disclosures, which provided the most comprehensive
information regarding the expert testimony, the en banc panel
concluded that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court
to exclude the expert testimony.71 Specifically, the court found that
there was nothing in Nacchio’s disclosures that connected the
expert’s experience to the ultimate conclusions he was making. The
court reasoned that the lack of connection between the expert’s
experience and his ultimate conclusion was essentially Nacchio asking
the court to “take the expert’s word for it” with nothing more.72
B. Petition for Certiorari
Nacchio appealed the Tenth Circuit decision to the United
States Supreme Court.73 The Supreme Court initially appeared to be
interested in taking the case as it delayed decision on the petition for
several months while it reviewed the issues in the case.74 Many
commentators believed that this was a sign the Court would take the
case because of the materiality issue.75 However, before the Court
made its certiorari decision, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the district
court’s calculations of Nacchio’s gains and forfeiture were
erroneous.76 With the new instructions provided by the Tenth

69. Id. at 1250.
70. Id. at 1252.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1258.
73. Dionne Searcey, Hope Still Alive for Joe Nacchio, WSJ BLOGS, June 29, 2009,
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/06/29/hope-still-alive-for-joe-nacchio/ (last visited Feb. 7,
2010). On the last day of the 2009 term, the court failed to make a decision on the case, but
requested the entire case file for review. Id.
74. Greg Avery, Supreme Court to Decide on Nacchio’s Request in October, DENVER
BUS. J., July 10, 2009, available at http://denver.bizjournals.com/denver/stories/2009/
07/13/story10.html.
75. See id.
76. Nacchio v. United States, 573 F.3d 1062, 1064 (10th Cir. 2009) (reversing and
remanding the case back to the district court for a recalculation of Nacchio’s forfeiture and
gains).
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Circuit for calculating Nacchio’s punishment, his total prison term
could be reduced from six years to three or four years, and his fine,
which originally totaled fifty-two million dollars, could be reduced to
forty-four million dollars.77 Federal prosecutors decided not to
pursue an appeal on the issue of forfeiture and gains.78 The Supreme
Court subsequently denied Nacchio’s petition for certiorari.79
IV. ANALYSIS
Two aspects of the Tenth Circuit’s opinion trouble many
observers. First, many are concerned that the Tenth Circuit failed to
recognize the differences in Rule 16 disclosures and the Daubert
standard regarding expert witnesses.80 Second, the Tenth Circuit has
broken new ground and, for the first time, has upheld the conviction
of a corporate executive on the basis of “soft” information that
questions public revenue projections.
A. Expert Testimony
In his dissenting opinion, Judge McConnell was particularly
concerned that the Tenth Circuit had conflated the requirements for
expert testimony in civil and criminal cases. Judge McConnell
explained that in criminal cases, a defendant does not have to
establish the foundation of an expert before trial, unless the district
court directs the defendant to do so.81 Here, Nacchio was required
to establish the foundation of his expert witness before trial during
the pretrial debate over whether his Rule 16 disclosures were
sufficient under the much more demanding Daubert standard.
Additionally, Judge McConnell explained that the majority’s rule
required Nacchio to satisfy the Daubert requirements for expert
testimony through written declarations in advance of trial.82 Judge

77. Kevin O’Brien, Nacchio Gains a 10th Circuit Court Victory on his Sentence and
Forfeiture, THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG, Aug. 1, 2009, http://www.theracetothe
bottom.org/criminal-law-and-governance/nacchio-gains-a-10th-circuit-court-victory-on-hissentence-a.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2010).
78. U.S. Government Won’t Fight Nacchio Sentence Ruling, REUTERS, Aug. 17, 2009,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1734943220090817.
79. Nacchio v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 54 (2009).
80. See Avery, supra note 74.
81. United States v. Nacchio (Nacchio II), 555 F.3d 1234, 1259 (10th Cir. 2009)
(McConnell, J., dissenting).
82. See id. at 1259–61.
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McConnell reasoned that this requirement violated principles of
criminal proceedings where a “defendant is entitled to keep his cards
close to the vest.”83 Thus, Judge McConnell argued a defendant only
has to make the most minimal disclosures during the pretrial phase
so as not to lose his adversarial edge in withholding defense strategy
until the last moment. Supporting this idea, Judge McConnell
reasoned, that “[i]n criminal cases . . . neither side has a general right
to discover the other’s evidence . . . .”84
Further, as the three judge panel recognized,85 although “Rule
16 provides the defense with some notice, the requirement of setting
forth ‘the bases and reasons for’ the witnesses’ opinions does not
track the methodological factors set forth by the Daubert Court.”86
Rule 16, then, is a lesser standard, requiring little of the defendant.
To comply with Rule 16 a defendant must only provide a basic
summary of an expert’s qualifications and testimony. “In contrast to
the detailed information that Daubert deemed essential,” one scholar
has explained, “the disclosures in the [Rule 16] summary are apt to
be too conclusory to educate [the other side] or . . . provide them
with effective ammunition for cross-examination.”87 Moreover, as
the three-judge panel recognized, “a Rule 16 disclosure need not be
filed with the court, but only with opposing counsel.” 88 In the
three-judge panel’s estimation, this makes it apparent that a Rule 16
disclosure is “not intended to serve as the basis for a judicial
determination regarding admissibility.”89 Thus, when the en banc
panel upheld the district court’s treatment of a challenge to a Rule
16 disclosure as a challenge under the Daubert standard, it subjected

83. Id. at 1259–60.
84. Id. at 1260.
85. United States v. Nacchio (Nacchio I), 519 F.3d 1140, 1151 (10th Cir. 2008).
86. Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test, 78 MINN.
L. REV. 1345, 1360 (1994); see also United States v. Rich, 326 F. Supp. 2d 670, 677 (E.D. Pa.
2004) (rejecting a defendant’s motion for a new trial partly on the basis that there was no
authority supporting the idea that Rule 16 reports must independently meet Daubert
requirements); Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert’s Invitation: Defining a
Role for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 1060–62
(1994) (explaining that a pretrial conference in accordance with Rule 16 may be used to
narrow pretrial disputes regarding expert testimony, a separate Daubert pretrial Daubert
hearing is common before a judge determines the admissibility of expert testimony).
87. Berger, supra note 86, at 1360.
88. Nacchio I, 519 F.3d at 1151 (footnote omitted).
89. Id.
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Nacchio’s Rule 16 filing to a much higher standard than is typical in
criminal cases.
Conversely, the majority argued that the district court’s
treatment of the Rule 16 challenge as a challenge under Daubert was
permissible because it was clear to Nacchio that the Rule 16 issue
was no longer at play, rather the Daubert standard had been
invoked. The majority reasoned that this was the case because of the
numerous objections made by the government on the grounds of
Daubert. Thus, it appears the court imposed a “constructive Daubert
test” on Nacchio. Despite Nacchio’s constructive notice that
Daubert was at issue, proper briefing of the Daubert issue never took
place. The district judge indicated that the Rule 16 filings and the
relevant party motions were all he needed to make a Daubert
determination.90 This notwithstanding the accepted view that “Rule
16 disclosure is not designed to allow the district court to move
immediately to a Daubert determination without briefs, a hearing, or
other appropriate means of testing the proposed expert’s
methodology.”91
The new standard adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Nacchio’s
case places defendants in the difficult situation of having to satisfy
the Daubert standard for expert witnesses when they file their Rule
16 disclosures, despite the important differences between criminal
and civil cases and despite the traditional understanding that Rule 16
disclosures are not a substitute for the more rigorous Daubert
standard. The Tenth Circuit is alone in this requirement.
B. Materiality and “Soft” Information
Many consider this case to be unique in that it is the first time an
individual has been convicted for trading on the basis of “soft”
internal corporate information regarding future revenue estimates.92
Nacchio supporters characterize this case as “the first time that a
corporate insider has ever faced insider trading charges based purely
on an internal debate regarding the accuracy of a prior public
financial projection.”93 The Nacchio camp argues that if a conviction
90. Id. at 1150.
91. Id. at 1151.
92. Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
Nacchio v. United States, 519 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2008) (No. 07–1311). The information is
labeled “soft” due to its uncertain nature. Id.
93. Id. at 2.
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is allowed to stand based on this “soft” information, the floodgates
will be open to both civil and criminal prosecutions against corporate
officials.
Future earnings estimates are unpredictable and difficult to
gauge. For this reason, when Nacchio became aware that Qwest’s
earning projections may have been overstated, there was no
guarantee that Qwest would undoubtedly fall short of the earnings
estimates. Nacchio could have led the company on a new path
designed to increase ongoing revenue streams to meet earnings
estimates. Thus, it is apparent that the future revenue projections
were uncertain at best.94
With this decision, the Tenth Circuit has entered into the
dangerous waters of allowing individuals to be prosecuted on “soft”
insider information, without announcing a standard for courts and
juries to follow regarding the certainty of the “soft” information.
The Nacchio case likely presents a bad example of why this prospect
is dangerous, as it seems clear that Nacchio was aware that the onetime revenue stream of IRUs was about to come to an end. And
there is no information that Qwest had implemented any policy to
improve revenue streams at the time Nacchio traded on the insider
information. In other words, it was certain at the time Nacchio
traded that there was a serious risk that Qwest would likely fall short
of revenue projections and that Nacchio was not implementing the
necessary changes to prevent earnings shortcomings.
Nevertheless, future cases are likely to present a much closer call
on whether the information is certain enough to be considered
material inside information. One can easily imagine a situation where
internal projections begin to show that a company will not meet its
public earnings estimates, however, a company may be able to
weather the storm and quickly change course to prevent a failure to
meet revenue projections. Under the Tenth Circuit’s standard, while
a company debates internal revenue projections, company officials
would be forced to either refrain from selling their company shares
for fear of prosecution or disclose the negative revenue projections to
the investing public, no matter how speculative and uncertain the
projections may be. Disclosing this negative information would
inevitably cause a loss of investor confidence in a company’s ability to
meet revenue projections, despite the fact the company could still

94. Searcey, supra note 73.
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stem the loss and improve revenue streams. Accordingly, disclosure
of a potential earnings shortfall would become a self-fulfilling
prophecy dooming a company to an earnings shortfall.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court, in denying certiorari in the
Nacchio case, missed an opportunity to develop a more distinct
standard for juries to determine whether “soft” information in the
form of internal revenue projections is certain enough to expose
company officers to potential insider trading liability.
Amicus briefs offered helpful suggestions to the Supreme Court
during the certiorari stage for developing a uniform jury instruction
capable of adequately measuring the materiality of internal revenue
projections. Specifically, the Washington Legal Foundation has
suggested that in an insider trading case based on “soft”
information, the trial court should instruct the jury that to be
material, new revenue data must be “‘so certain’ that . . . the
previously publicly announced forecast no longer had a ‘reasonable
basis.’”95 This would be a practical instruction that would allow the
jury to successfully evaluate the “probability” and “magnitude”96 of
the “soft” information available to the defendant when he traded.
Because materiality is such an indefinite concept, particularly in the
context of “soft” information, more exacting jury instructions are
needed.
V. CONCLUSION
Joseph Nacchio is certainly not a sympathetic character. Many
view his conviction a “victory over greedy corporate chieftains.”97
However, the Tenth Circuit’s decisions in the Nacchio line of cases
will impact corporate officials who are honestly trying to comply
with insider trading laws, and will generally lead to greater confusion
in the Tenth Circuit for juries and judges when faced with complex
insider trading issues.
First, in Nacchio II, the Tenth Circuit conflated the requirements
of Rule 16 disclosures and the requirements for qualifying experts
under the Daubert standard. Accordingly, an onerous burden has
been placed on defendants to satisfy the high Daubert standard at an

95. Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 92, at 16.
96. Id.; see Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
97. See U.S. Government Won’t Fight Nacchio Sentence Ruling, supra note 78.
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early stage of a trial. Conflating these two standards will mean that
some defendants who believe they have complied with Rule 16
disclosures will later be surprised to find that their expert is unable to
testify because they failed to comply with Daubert, nor will they be
given a second chance to do so. Thus, defendants in the Tenth
Circuit must ensure that they comply with the Daubert requirements
at an earlier stage in the trial than is required by any other circuit
court.
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit’s en banc decision regarding
materiality in the “soft” information context will leave lower court
juries and judges uncertain about how to decide the fate of corporate
insiders guilty of trading company stock on the basis of uncertain
internal corporate revenue projections. Further, the precedent set by
the Tenth Circuit in the Nacchio case could have the negative effect
of discouraging companies from disclosing optimistic or ambitious
revenue projections to the public out of fear that making trades
while internal documents question the accuracy of the projections
will leave officers potentially liable for insider trading violations. This
will mean that investors will have less information as they make their
investment decisions. Accordingly, a new standard requiring that
“soft” information be certain to a high-degree before insider trading
liability can attach is appropriate to avoid the chilling effect that will
likely come to corporate insiders doing business in the Tenth Circuit.
Andrew Law
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